We nest conjectural parameters into a standard oligopoly model. The conjectural parameters are modeled as functions of multimarket contact. Using data from the US airline industry, we find: i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, while carriers serving many...

We investigate the role of limited access to airport facilities as a determinant of the hub premium in the US airline industry. We use original data from competition plans that airports are required to submit to the Department of Transportation in compliance with the Aviation Investment and...

We nest conduct parameters into a standard oligopoly model. The conduct parameters are modeled as functions of multimarket contact. Using data from the US airline industry, we find: i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, while carriers serving many markets...

We investigate the role of limited access to airport facilities as a determinant of the hub premium in the U.S. airline industry. We use original data from competition plans that airports are required to submit to the U.S. Department of Transportation in compliance with the Aviation Investment...

We show that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion in the US airline industry using two complementary approaches. First, we show that the more extensive is the overlap in the markets that the two firms serve, i) the more firms internalize the effect of their pricing decisions on the...

We provide empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion in the US airline industry using two complementary approaches. First, we show that the more extensive is the overlap in the markets that the two firms serve, i) the more firms internalize...

We study the effect of consolidation on airline network connectivity using three measures of centrality from graph theory: Degree, Closeness, and Betweenness. Changes in these measures from 1990 to 2015 imply: i) the average airport services a greater proportion of possible routes, ii) the...

We investigate whether handsomely rewarding bank executives’ realizes superior efficiency by determining if executive remuneration contracts produce incentives that offset potential agency problems and lead to improvements in bank efficiency. We calculate executive Delta and Vega to proxy...

The Mexican programme of bank privatisation in the early 1990s was dictated not just by a desire for distancing government from the running of the economy but also by the need to raise money by selling public assets in favour of a particular fiscal stance. The conflict of objectives entailed in...