We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&Dwith spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre-competitiveR&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&Dsubsidy can be negative,...

We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&D with spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre-competitive R&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative,...

We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&D with spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre-competitive R&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative,...

The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not...

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. The e?ect of combining the two schemes is also...

We provide a theoretical justification for bi-sourcing, which refers to the situation where a final goods producer buys an input from an outside supplier and also produces it in-house. Bi-sourcing occurs if the marginal cost of producing the input in-house is higher than the marginal cost of...

A poor country with volatile export prices borrows in international markets. When debt is denominated in foreign currency, there is a temptation to repudiate when export prices are low. Excusable partial defaults reduce this temptation, and thus help to support lending.

We consider strategic government policies on the exports of final goods and on the input production when the inputs are non-tradable and produced by the foreign firms. If the policies consist of only per-unit tax/subsidies either on the final goods or on the inputs, it is optimal for the...

We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identical individual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric and concave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles (Econ....