We develop a theory that explains the difference between public and private ownership for the case of firms that are well approximated by an owner\managed or closely held form of firm. The theory is based on government monitoring and control of actions that potentially allow managersto divert...

Negotiations between a country in default and its international creditors are modeled as a dynamic game in an environment of weak contractual enforcement. The country cannot borrow internation- ally until it settles with all creditors. Delay arises in equilibrium as creditors engage in strategic...

We examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase patents in the hands of two di¤erent patent owners. Complementarity of these patents in the production process of the company is a prime e¢ciency reason for them being owned (or licenced) by the company. We show that this very...

It is well known in the theoretical literature on deregulation, that any informative signal will be used to give the firm appropriate incentives. This paper presents a model of deregulation that draws on the multi-task model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Sufficient conditions are derived for...

We develop a theory that explains the difference between public and private ownership for the case of firms that are well approximated by an owner\managed or closely held form of firm. The theory is based on government monitoring and control of actions that potentially allow managers to divert...

Negotiations between a country in default and its international creditors are modeled as a dynamic game in an environment of weak contractual enforcement. The country cannot borrow internation- ally until it settles with all creditors. Delay arises in equilibrium as creditors engage in strategic...