This paper argues that firm efficiency and stability, as well as workers' satisfaction, can be achieved through participatory decision-making rules. It offers theoretical rationales and empirical illustrations based on the framing and operation of European works councils. Employees should take...

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...

This paper examines contracting between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in a setting with unobservable effort when contracts are renegotiated each period. The contribution of our paper lies in the insights it provides on optimal contracts in this setting. The insights from our model...

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...

The paper analyzes the seller's expected revenue in auctions with a large number of asymmetric players. We explicitly calculate the revenue in large asymmetric first-price, second-price, and optimal auctions to O(1/n^3) accuracy, where n is the number of players. These calculations show that the...

Research shows that audit fees have increased after the SOX ban on providing non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients, but the reasons behind it have been unclear. Using an auction-modeling approach, this study aims to bridge this gap by providing a theoretical explanation for this empirical...

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...

Valuation requires the prediction of future growth rate of persistent earnings, which depend on past and present internal, unobservable, investment decisions. In this study, we investigate the quot;managementquot; of the series of growth rates in a multi-period principal-agent model with a moral...

We consider two private-value auctions where the prize in one is higher than the prize in the other. We show that a separating equilibrium exists where bidders with a high valuation attend the auction with the higher prize while the weak bidders attend the auction with the lower prize. In...

Valuation requires the prediction of future growth rate of persistent earnings, whichdepend on past and present internal, unobservable, investment decisions. In this study, we investigate the acirc;not;Smanagementacirc;not;? of the series of growth rates in a multi-period principal-agent model...