We study a generalization of the Heston model, which consists of two coupled stochastic differential equations, one for the stock price and the other one for the volatility. We consider a cubic nonlinearity in the first equation and a correlation between the two Wiener processes, which model the...

We review the recent approach of correlation based networks of financial equities. We investigate portfolio of stocks at different time horizons, financial indices and volatility time series and we show that meaningful economic information can be extracted from noise dressed correlation...

In this paper we study common belief of rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative doxastic model of beliefs. We characterize the three main solution concepts for such games, viz., Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS), Iterated...

We provide a new characterization of AGM belief revision in terms of a Kripke-Stalnaker-Lewis semantics. We consider pointed frames consisting of a set of states, a distinguished state interpreted as the actual state, a Kripke belief relation and a Stalnaker-Lewis selection function. Adding a...

In [5] (Int. J. Game Theory, 42:567-592, 2013) a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) was introduced for extensive-form games and shown to be intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed notion is the...

Johan van Benthem has highlighted in his work that many questions arising in the analysis of strategic interaction call for logical and computational analysis. These questions lead to both formal and conceptually illuminating answers, in that they contribute to clarifying some of the underlying...

We investigate the extension of backward-induction to von Neumann extensive games (where information sets have a synchronous structure) and provide an epistemic characterization of it. Extensions of the idea of backward-induction were proposed by Penta (2009) and later by Perea (2013), who also...

This is the first draft of a chapter in a planned book on the Prisoner's Dilemma, edited by Martin Peterson, to be published by Cambridge University Press. It discusses the nature of the conditionals involved in deliberation, taking the Prisoner's Dilemma game as point of departure. --...

In (5) a solution concept for extensive-form games was introduced, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is a strict refinement of PBE. In (6) the notion of PBE...