The concept of a non-extreme-outcome-additive capacity (neo-additive capacity ) is introduced.Neo-additive capacitiesmodel optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncertaintyas observed in many experimental studies. Moreover, neo-additive capacities canbe applied easily in economic...

The concept of a non-extreme-outcome-additive capacity (neo-additive capacity ) is introduced. Neo-additive capacities model optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty as observed in many experimental studies. Moreover, neo-additive capacities can be applied easily in economic...

The concept of a non-extreme-outcome-additive capacity (neo-additive capacity ) is introduced. Neo-additive capacities model optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty as observed in many experimental studies. Moreover, neo-additive capacities can be applied easily in economic...

We provide a simple and intuitive set of axioms that allow for a direct and constructive proof of the Choquet Expected Utility representation for decision making under uncertainty.

This paper shows that, for CEU preferences, the axioms consquentialism, state independenceand conditional certainty equivalent consistency under updating characterise a family of capacities,called Genralised Neo-Additive Capacities (GNAC). This family contains as special casesamong others...

This paper shows that, for CEU preferences, the axioms consquentialism, state independence and conditional certainty equivalent consistency under updating characterise a family of capacities, called Genralised Neo-Additive Capacities (GNAC). This family contains as special cases among others...

This paper studies how updating affects ambiguity-attitude. In particular we focus on the generalized Bayesian update of the Jaffray-Phillipe sub-class of Choquet Expected Utility preferences. We find conditions for ambiguity-attitude to be the same before and after updating. A necessary and...

Raiffa (1961) has suggested that ambiguity aversion will cause a strict preference for randomization. We show that dynamic consistency implies that individuals will be indifferent to ex ante randomizations. On the other hand, it is possible for a dynamically-consistent ambiguity averse...