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This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals ha ve more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781721
There are many economic environments in which an object is offered sequentially to prospective buyers. It is often observed that once the object for sale is turned down by one or more agents, those that follow do the same. One explanation that has been proposed for this phenomenon, which goes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012265352
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990b) consider a simple decentralized market in which agents either meet randomly or choose their partners volunatarily and bargain over the terms on which they are willing to trade. Intuition suggests that if there are no transaction costs, the outcome of this matching...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593559
Even with complete information, two-person bargaining can generate a large number of equilibria, involving disagreements and inefficiencies, in (i) negotiation games where disagreement payoffs are endogenously determined (Busch and Wen, 1995) and (ii) costly bargaining games where there are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005811529
We investigate the effect of introducing costs of complexity in the n -person unanimity bargaining game. In particular, the paper provides a justification for stationary equilibrium strategies in the class of games where complexity costs matter. As is well-known, in this game every individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699395
This paper considers the ``negotiation game'' Busch and Wen (1995)) which combines the features of two-person alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibria some of which involve delay and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005699675
This paper considers the "negotiation game" (Busch and Wen, 1995) which combines the features of two-person alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibria some of which involve delay in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702743