In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. when the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide...

In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. when the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide...

The intent of the patent system is to encourage innovation by granting the innovator exclusive rights to a discovery for a limited period of time: with monopoly power, the innovator can recover the costs of creating the innovation which otherwise might not have existed. And, over time, the...

We study economic environments in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria and call the associated class of dynamic adjustment rules comparative dynamics. We distinguish two classes of learning behavior: learning from the population experience (imitative dynamics)...

We provide an axiomatization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation. Our result differs from an earlier characterization due to Ebert and Moyes in the way the reference group of an individual is represented in the model. Ebert and Moyes require the index to be defined for all logically...

This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of...

McCausland (2004a) describes a new theory of random consumer demand. Theoretically consistent random demand can be represented by a "regular" "L-utility" function on the consumption set X. The present paper is about Bayesian inference for regular L-utility functions. We express prior and...

We reconsider the following cost-sharing problem: agent i = 1, ...,n demands a quantity xi of good i; the corresponding total cost C(x1, ..., xn) must be shared among the n agents. The Aumann-Shapley prices (p1, ..., pn) are given by the Shapley value of the game where each unit of each good is...

We examine the maximal-element rationalizability of choice functions with arbitrary domains. While rationality formulated in terms of the choice of greatest elements according to a rationalizing relation has been analyzed relatively thoroughly in the earlier literature, this is not the case for...