The popular support obtained by two parties who propose two qualitatively different tax schernes is analyzed. We show that if the median voter is below the mean, then any progressive proposal always wins over a regressive one, provided it leaves the poorest agent at least as well off as the...

We analyze existence of divergent equilibria in a model of endogenous party platforms with stochastic membership, while the membership depends bothon the proposals of the parties and the unobserved idiosyncratic preferecnces of citizens over parties. It is shown that when citizens view the...

This paper attempts to detect the existence of links in consumptionpreferences between generations. Preferences for consumption goods may bedetermined by the preferences of parents (vertical transmission) and/or bypreferences arising from the environment (horizontal transmission). Wepropose an...

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme position s of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise...

We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These functions are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and must satisfy...

This paper studies the economic determinants, from an aggregate perspective, of Spanishinterregional labor force flows. Its main characteristics are that it is based on a matching model ofthe labor market applied to migration, and that uses gross flows instead of net ones as otherstudies do....

This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first some voters are policy motivated and some are "impressionable" - their vote depends directly on campaign...

This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It isassumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than thestatus quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner. It is well known that in a modelwithout...

We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform...

We put in perspective two competing hypothesis on the nature of intergenerational transfers: altruism vs. exchange motivation. Unlike previous approaches, we concentrate on non-monetary transfers measured as the effort that parents need to make in order to prevent children?s fatal health...