In this paper, we provide a characterization of interim inefficiency in stochastic economies of overlapping generations under possibly sequentially incomplete markets. With respect to the established body of results in the literature, we remove the hypothesis of two-period horizons, by...

We show that sovereign debt is unsustainable if debt contracts are not supported by direct sanctions and default carries only a ban from ever borrowing in financial markets even in the presence of uninsurable risks and time-varying interest rate. This extension of Bulow and Rogoff, 1989 requires...

We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for repayment; that is, even without collateral or legal sanctions available to creditors. In an incomplete asset market, when the rate of interest falls recurrently below the rate of growth of the...

In this paper, we consider economies with (possibly endogenous) solvency constraints under uncertainty. Constrained ine±ciency corresponds to a feasible redistribution yielding a welfare improvement beginning from ev- ery contingency reached by the economy. A sort of Cass Criterion (Cass [10])...

I provide a complete characterization of equilibrium with risk of default in sequential economies under uncertainty. Default induces permanent exclusion from financial markets and not-too-tight solvency constraints prevent debt repudiation at equilibrium. The method of analysis relies on a...

In this paper we study the welfare effects of monetary policy in a simple overlapping generation economy in which agents voluntarily contribute to a public good. Inflation has two effects at equilibrium: it increases voluntary contributions and it misallocates private consumption across time. We...

We prove indeterminacy of competitive equilibrium in sequential economies, where limited commitment requires the endogenous determination of solvency constraints preventing debt repudiation (Alvarez and Jermann [3]). In particular, we show that, for any arbitrary value of social welfare in...

This paper investigates the relation between risk and the degree of financial intermediation in a model with moral hazard. Entrepreneurs can simultaneously get credit from two type of competing institutions:"financial intermediairies" and "local lenders". The former are competitive firms issuing...