We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters' type space is either uni- or bidimensional. We show that a Condorcet winner fails to generically exist even with a unidimensional type space. We then study two voting procedures widely used in the literature. The...

We examine several functional and numerical measures of wage discrimination in the spirit of the Lorenz curve. The First Order discrimination curve is based on the comparison of the wage CDF of two subpopulations. Three different Second Order discrimination curves are derived to refine the first...

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.

In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving...