In this paper we consider Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty. We prove existence of equilibrium when there is a general state space representing aggregate uncertainty. when the economy is stationary and the underlying process governing aggregate uncertainty Markov, we provide...

We study economic environments in which agents make choices on the basis of relative performance criteria and call the associated class of dynamic adjustment rules comparative dynamics. We distinguish two classes of learning behavior: learning from the population experience (imitative dynamics)...

The intent of the patent system is to encourage innovation by granting the innovator exclusive rights to a discovery for a limited period of time: with monopoly power, the innovator can recover the costs of creating the innovation which otherwise might not have existed. And, over time, the...

We develop a method for solving for equilibrium outcomes in stationary strategic settings in which speculators are informationally large and understand how their actions affect the information content of prices. This allows us to characterize speculation by institutional investors who receive...

Dramatic microstructure changes in equity markets have made standard liquidity measures less accurate proxies of trading costs. We develop trade-time liquidity measures that reflect per-dollar price impacts of fixed-dollar volumes. Our measures (i) better capture institutional trading costs; and...

Blockholder disclosure thresholds shape incentives for hedge fund activism, which are jointly determined with real investment and managerial behavior. Uninformed investors value lower thresholds (greater transparency) when the cost of trading against an informed activist outweighs the benefits...

We show that when borrowers are privately informed about their creditworthiness and lenders have a soft budget constraint, efficient investment requires a limit on the fraction of a firm’s cash flows that can be pledged to outsiders. That is, pledgeability should neither be too low nor too...

Hedge fund managers differ in ability and investors want to distinguish good ones from bad. Via the design of their investment strategies, better fund managers want to ease this inference problem while worse fund managers want to complicate it. We impose only the minimal restrictions on the...