An overlapping-generations model where agents choose whether to become educated when young is presented. Education enhances productivity, but needs to be financed by borrowing. Because of the possibility of default, lenders may ration credit. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium with and...

An overlapping-generations model where agents choose whether to become educated when young is presented. Education enhances productivity, but needs to be financed by borrowing. Because of the possibility of default, lenders may ration credit. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium with and...

An overlapping-generations model where agents choose whether to become educated when young is presented. Education enhances productivity, but needs to be financed by borrowing. Because of the possibility of default, lenders may ration credit. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium with and...

Although there are many stock market anomalies which the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) finds difficult to explain, it also has its strengths, and so far no alternative hypothesis has been developed which can explain what the EMH explains but which can also do a better job in explaining the...

Although there are many stock market anomalies which the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) finds difficult to explain, it also has its strengths, and so far no alternative hypothesis has been developed which can explain what the EMH explains but which can also do a better job in explaining the...

In this paper we combine AcemogluÂ’s model of the economic origins of democracy with LohmannÂ’s model of political massprotest. This alllows us to provide ananalysis of the economic causes of political regimec hange based on the micro foundations of rebellion. We are able tod erive...