We present a model of timing of seasonal sales where stores choose several designs at the beginning of the season without knowing which one, if any, will be fashionable. Fashionable designs have a chance to fetch high prices in fashion markets while non-fashionable ones must be sold in a...

When employers cannot tell whether a school truly has many good students or whether it is just giving easy grades, schools have an incentive to inflate grades to help their mediocre students. However schools also care about preserving the value of good grades for their good students. We...

We present a two-period model of the assignment market with uncertainty in the first period regarding productive characteristics of participants. This model is used to understand incentives toward early contracts or unraveling in labor markets for entry-level professionals. We study two...

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

This paper considers a model of a rating agency with multiple clients, in which each client has a separate market that forms a belief about the quality of the client after the agency issues a rating. When the clients are rated separately (individual rating), the credibility of a good rating in...

This paper provides evidence to show that in the presence of imperfect formal institutions there is both a substitutional and a complementary relationship between accounting information and reputation, an informal institution. Empirical results using a sample of family firms listed in the...