This paper presents an overlapping generations model to explain why humans live in families rather than in other pair groupings. Since most non-human species are not familial, something special must be behind the family. It is shown that the two necessary features that explain the origin of the...

We consider a multi-sector general equilibrium model with IO linkages, sector-specific productivities and tax rates. Using tools from network theory, we investigate how the IO structure interacts with productivities and taxes in the determination of aggregate income. We show that aggregate...

In overlapping-generations economies with perfect financial markets and lumpsum taxation, restrictions on the government budget deficits do not limit the set of achievable allocations. For economies in which tax instruments are distortionary and limited in number, deficits are irrelevant only in...

In the present paper the study of the welfare effects of endowment transfers is extended to the set of steady states of a general stationary overlapping generation model. A complete characterization of manipulations by coalitions and transfers which leads to welfare paradoxes is provided.

We propose a model of economic growth in which technological progress is modelled as an expanding random network of ideas. New ideas are created by combining successful old ideas. Old ideas are chosen according to their visibility as ideas, success as generators of innovations and age but the...

individuals care only for the propagation of their own genes, our analysis indicates that fidelity families dominate promiscuous pair bonding, in the sense that they can achieve greater survivorship and enhanced genetic fitness. The explanation lies in the free riding behavior that characterizes...

We introduce relative concerns in the form of conspicuous consumption in a standard economic geography model a la Krugman. The keeping up with the Joneses effect brings a negative externality to some agents and gives them incentives to escape. The primary intuition is then that conspicuous...

In the present paper we uncover a novel mechanism through which a minority can gain a disproportionate power in a perfectly functioning democracy. In our model, a government elected by majority within a two party democracy, decides on a unique redistributive instrument, the tax rate. We show...