This paper investigates the properties of the most common form of reinforcement learning (the "basic model" of Erev and Roth, American Economic Review, 88, 848-881, 1998). Stochastic approximation theory has been used to analyse the local stability of fixed points under this learning process....

Win Stay, Lose Shift as well as imitation strategies for iterated games rely on an aspiration level. With both learning rules a move is repeated unless the pay-off fell short of the aspiration level. I investigate social adaptation mechanisms for the aspiration level and their impact on the...

In this paper we study a simple learning paradigm for iterated normal form games in an evolutionary context. Following the decision theoretic concept of satisficing we design players with a certain aspiration level. If their payoff is below this level, they change their current action, otherwise...

We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP' (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We...

We report laboratory experiments that use new, visually oriented software to explore the dynamics of 3 x 3 games with intransitive best responses. Each moment, each player is matched against the entire population, here 8 human subjects. A heat map offers instantaneous feedback on current profit...

This paper considers the effects of changes in the income distribution in an economy where agents’ utility depends both on consumption and on their rank in the distribution of consumption of a positional good. We introduce a new methodology to compare the behavior of agents that occupy the...