Most large companies voluntarily disclose information about their corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We use experimental markets to examine how managers' disclosures of a particular type of CSR, green investment, affect investors' bidding behavior. We find that, although in our...

We provide a list of Points to Consider (PTCs) to help researchers self-assess whether they have addressed certain common issues that arise frequently in accounting research seminars and in reviewers' and editors' comments on papers submitted to journals. Anticipating and addressing such issues...

Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same...

We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors substantially overbid relative to other majors; and...

We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors substantially overbid relative to other majors; and...

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning...

In conducting experiments with multiple trials, outcomes from previous trials can impact on current behavior. One of the most obvious cases in which this can happen, and the case considered in this paper, is in an auction market experiment, where earnings from previous auction trials alter cash...

We investigate the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) noncooperative game theoretic bargaining model of legislative equilibrium. Legislative outcomes are sensitive to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be voted on. With a random proposal recognition rule and a closed...

"We find clear demographic and ability effects on bidding in common value auctions: inexperienced women are much more susceptible to the winner's curse than men, controlling for SAT/ACT scores and college major; economics and business majors substantially overbid relative to other majors; and...

We examine the role of cognitive ability, personality traits and gender in a one-shot gift exchange experiment. Controlling for cognitive ability and personality characteristics, men offer higher wages than women do, as do agents with greater cognitive ability and those scoring higher on...