In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerant implementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of the k-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity...

This paper aims to test the hypothesis of the existence of significant tax competition between communes, which mainly concerns the share of value-added tax (VAT) proceeds, by exploring the system for allocating intergovernmental transfers in Morocco and analyzing the determinants of VAT...

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and...

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerant implementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008 a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of the k-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity...

In this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion in the standard prisoner's dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychological behaviors. This concept enables to take account each player's assessment of the other player's behavior and the asymmetry of information. We determine...

This paper belongs to the recent literature which explores the consequence(s) of allowing some player(s) to be minimally honest in the standard Nash implementation. In this literature, Dutta and Sen(2012) give sufficient conditions for the implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash...

In this work, we extend the concept of Fault Tolerant Implementation of Eliaz (2002) to the concept of Fault Tolerant Implementation in incomplete information environments. In particular, we work in a domain where information is non-exclusive by choosing a model of pure exchange economy. As in...

In this work, we extend the concept of Fault Tolerant Implementation of Eliaz (2002) to the concept of Fault Tolerant Implementation in incomplete information environments. In particular, we work in a domain where information is non-exclusive by choosing a model of pure exchange economy. As in...

In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice...

In this paper, we consider a standard model of many-to-one matching markets. First, we study the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity under a certain requirement and we prove these two properties become equivalent. Second, we illustrate that this result has an immediate impact on...