Relying upon voluntary contributions for public goods provision generally results in the under-provision of the good relative to first-best levels due to the free-rider problem. Taxation/allocation schemes have been designed which solve the free-rider problem, but are too complex to implement....

A simple theory is developed which formally describes how charities can resolve the information asymmetry problems faced by small donors by working with large donors to generate quality signals. To test the model, two large-scale natural field experiments were conducted. In the first experiment,...

Some researchers have argued that anchoring in economic valuations casts doubt on the assumption of consistent and stable preferences. We present new evidence that questions the robustness of certain anchoring results. We then present a theoretical framework that provides insights into why we...

This paper studies the incentives for international cooperation if (some) countries prefer a more equitable distribution of per capita emission levels. The impact of such an equity preference is analyzed first for a bilateral, and then for a multilateral environmental problem. We show that -...

This paper analyzes decisions on emissions of a stock pollutant under uncertainty in a two period model. Decisions are based on a weighted average of expected utility (EU) and the MaxiMin criterion. I first show that more weight on the worst case (less weight on EU) may lead to increased first...

This paper investigates ambiguity attitudes for natural events (temperatures) and how they are updated following new information. Using a general population sample, we first obtain baseline ambiguity attitudes for future weather events based on real temperatures over several past days. Second,...

This study measures the differences in ambiguity attitudes of groups and individuals in the gain and loss domain. We elicit the ambiguity attitudes and ambiguity-generated insensitivity for natural temperature events. We do not find significant differences between individuals and groups in our...

Carbon control policies in OECD countries commonly differentiate emission prices in favor of energy-intensiveindustries. While leakage provides a efficiency argument for differential emission pricing, the lattermay be a disguised beggar-thy-neighbor policy to exploit terms of trade. Using an...