This paper proposes the use of optimal grouping methods for determining the various age groups within a population. The cuto� ages for these groups, such as the age from which an individual is considered to be an older person, are then endogenous variables that depend on the entire population...

This paper proposes the use of optimal grouping methods for determining the various age groups within a population. The cuto� ages for these groups, such as the age from which an individual is considered to be an older person, are then endogenous variables that depend on the entire population...

This paper proposes the use of optimal grouping methods for determining the various age groups within a population. The cutoff ages for these groups, such as the age from wich an individual is considered to be an older person, are then endogenous variables that depend on the entire population...

This paper proposes the use of optimal grouping methods for determining the various age groups within a population. The cutoff ages for these groups, such as the age from wich an individual is considered to be an older person, are then endogenous variables that depend on the entire population...

This paper proposes the use of optimal grouping methods for determining the various age groups within a population. The cutoff ages for these groups, such as the age from wich an individual is considered to be an older person, are then endogenous variables that depend on the entire population...

This paper proposes the use of optimal grouping methods for determining the various age groups within a population. The cutoff ages for these groups, such as the age from which an individual is considered to be an older person, are then endogenous variables that depend on the entire population...

What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by their success in terms of resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals’ preferences are their private information, a convex combinations of selfishness and morality stand out as...

In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies compete by bidding for legislators?votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving...

We examine the characteristics of the optimal insurance contract under linear transaction cost and an ambiguous distribution of losses. Under the standard expected utility model, we know from Arrow (1965) that it contains a straight deductible. In this paper, we assume that the policyholder is...