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This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332403
This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting rules, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332460
This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting rules, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023656
This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023661
This paper discusses an aspect of computational complexity in social choice theory. We consider the problem of designing voting rules, which is formulated in terms of simple games. We prove that it is an NP-complete problem to decide whether a given simple game is stable, or not. --...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321306
This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321328
This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059114
Drawing upon knowledge-based view and transaction-costs perspective, the study identifies customer relationship orientation and structural flexibility as the two key mechanisms that service multinationals can use to capture the benefits and mitigate the costs of global demand heterogeneity....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217652
Human resource management (HRM) scholars and practitioners are increasingly interested in how to leverage HRM tools to address pressing environmental issues while balancing an organization’s need for profit. One important theme of this line of research is the use of contingent compensation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015395566
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014304642