This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of...

This paper investigates the costs, benefits and frequency of management earnings guidance issued by firms manipulating earnings. We find that, when manipulations are detected, misstating firms issuing guidance and their managers incur additional legal costs, as reflected in the higher settlement...

This paper examines the associations of Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs’) prosocial behavior with their career paths and corporate policies. Using individuals’ involvement with charitable organizations as a proxy for prosocial behavior, we find that prosocial individuals are promoted to...

This paper examines the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) prosocial tendency and their companies’ accounting information quality. We measure CEOs’ prosocial tendency using their involvement with charitable organizations. Our results suggest that prosocial CEOs are...

We examine the effect of the common ownership relation between brokerage houses and the firms covered by their analysts (referred to as co-owned brokerage houses, co-owned firms, and connected analysts, respectively) on analyst forecast performance. Common ownership can help the connected...

The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market,...

Firms often make mistakes, from simple manufacturing overruns all the way to catastrophic blunders. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the nature of corporate responses when faced with evidence that an error has taken place, and, therefore, in the likelihood that such errors will...

We examine determinants of internal control deficiencies using a sample of 779 firms disclosing material weaknesses from August 2002 to August 2005. We find that material weaknesses in internal control are more likely for firms that are smaller, younger, financially weaker, more complex, growing...

We examine the stock market consequences of disclosing accounting irregularities for U.S.-listed foreign firms. After controlling for the severity of the irregularity and other firm characteristics, we find that foreign firms experience significantly more negative short-window stock market...

The use of more or less optimistic language in corporate disclosures has been the subject of increased interest in the academic literature. We add to this stream of research by examining the manager-specific component in the tone of earnings-announcement related conference calls. We find that...