For insurers conducting traditional activities: prudential measures need to recognize the medium and long term nature of the liabilities; appropriate buffers should be used effectively to minimize pro-cyclical effects...

We use data from over 20,000 firms in 60 countries to identify constraints on the growth offirms. We interpret managers´ answers to survey questions on the extent to which variousaspects of their external environment inhibit the performance of their firm as measuring theshadow cost of...

In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its membersfind it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherentasymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informalsanctioning harder to accomplish...

In a two-person finitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentionsdata to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utilitymodel specification, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefsabout others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationshipto...

We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identicalindividual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric andconcave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles...

In this paper, we analyse competition among jurisdictions to attract firms through low taxes oncapital and/or high level of public goods, which enhance firms’ productivity. We assume that thecompeting jurisdictions are different in (population) size and that the mobility of capital is...

We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom-Blume-Varian model of non-cooperative voluntary contributions to a public goodthat avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is in-creased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the...

We present a rigorous, yet elementary, demonstration of the existence of a uniqueLindahl equilibrium under the assumptions that characterize the standard n-player public goodmodel. Indeed, our approach, which exploits the aggregative structure of the public goodmodel, lends itself to a...

We examine whether an economy can have a bad (small or no formal sector, hightaxes) as well as a good (small or no informal sector, low taxes) equilibrium...

This paper provides an analytical framework for exploring the relationshipbetween equity and efficiency for two riparians sharing a transboundary river.Decreasing marginal productivities of water make a noncooperative approach inefficientwhen water is scarce. If the upstream riparian uses its...