This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...

We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private information to each bidder. The crucial feature is that one bidder is favored by the allocation rule in the sense that he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the...

We analyze mechanism choices of competing sellers with private valuations and show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers with higher reservation value choose mechanisms with a lower selling probability and a larger revenue in case of trade. As an application we...

We analyze mechanism choices of competing sellers with private valuations and show the existence of monotone pure strategy equilibria where sellers with higher reservation value choose mechanisms with a lower selling probability and a larger revenue in case of trade. As an application we...

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents who have private information on their ability. Two heterogenous firms - characterized by vertical, respectively horizontal,...

We analyze a model of delegated expertise with limited liability where both the agent's effort and his findings are unobservable. We show that the latter assumption reduces the agent's effort and the principal's profit in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Most interestingly, the...

We consider a model of optimal law enforcement where sanctions can be reduced for self-reporting individuals. The literature is extended in two directions: First, we distinguish between two self-reporting stages: a first one before the case is investigated, and a second one where the criminal is...

We extend the analysis of self-reporting schemes to criminal teams. When the violators behave non-cooperatively, maximum deterrence can be reached at virtually no cost by designing a prisoners' dilemma. One drawback of such a scheme is that it might induce cooperative behaviour in the...