Over the past few years, firms in the travel and entertainment industries have begun using novel sales strategies for revenue management. In this chapter, we study a selling strategy called opaque selling, in which firms guarantee one of several fully specified products, but hide the identity of...

We study how a high quality service firm selects a service rate differently than a low quality service firm when the firm cannot communicate its service value or service rate to its customer base. As a result, potential customers may take the queue length upon arrival into account when assessing...

We study how the seat value perceived by consumers, after attending an event in a theater/stadium, depends on the location of their seat relative to the stage/field. We develop a measure of perceived seat value, called Seat Value Index, and relate it to seat location characteristics and consumer...

We study how rational customers choose between two congested service facilities with finite buffer space and unknown service value when waiting is expensive. Customers observe an imperfect private signal indicating which service facility may provide more service value, as well as the queue...

Problem Definition: Customers arriving at a service provider are faced with a queue. On joining the queue, they get to observe the service speed while waiting in the queue. They renege if the updated wait times are too long. When and how should a revenue-maximizing service provider share service...

Platforms have come under criticism from regulatory agencies, policymakers, and media scholars for the unfettered spread of fake news online. A key concern is that, as fake news becomes prevalent, individuals may fall into online "echo chambers" that predominantly expose them only to fake news....

We study a single queue joining equilibrium when there is uncertainty in the consumers' minds about the service rate and value. Without such uncertainty, the joining equilibria are characterized by means of a single threshold queue length above which consumers do not join (Naor, 1969). We show...

Many firms have difficulty evaluating the impact of their pricing policy, which further inhibits their ability to design and implement dynamic pricing. We address this issue in the context of single-game ticket pricing for a Major League Baseball franchise. We develop and estimate a...

Firms sometimes nurture long lines, rather than raising prices to eliminate waiting times. We justify this practice by considering the informational role of a queue in a setting in which a firm can also adjust its price to signal its quality to uninformed consumers. When the proportion of...

Problem Definition: We explore how to design professional services in markets that cater to customers with differential usage capabilities. Professional customers avail the service and tailor it to their use, whereas amateur customers, lacking the relevant expertise, obtain the service through a...