This paper studies the externality that arises between principals when their agents can engage in ex post trading of the outcomes of their efforts to improve the matching of the outcomes to the principals. It shows that each principal has an incentive to use her contract with her own agent to...

We consider a war of attrition with stochastic deadlines in which the players can learn about the state that determines their payoffs at deadline. We study how the players' incentives to acquire information depend on the (un)verifiability of information and what implications these incentives...

A sender who wants to influence a decision maker has no incentive to collect information if he has to reveal all evidence so obtained, because the expected value of posterior belief is equal to the prior. If he can conceal his evidence at a cost, he invests more in obtaining information when...

In this paper, we allow an expert with moral hazard to have private information on what would happen to his client both with his service and without his service. The contingent component in the contract this expert offers helps overcome his moral hazard, but also serves as a signal of his...