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In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator' a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366547
In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculatora bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002909334
T.W. Schultz (1975) proposed that returns to human capital were highest in economicenvironments where technology, price or production shocks were common and managerial skillsto adapt resource allocations to those shocks were most in need. We hypothesize that variationin returns to human capital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009305073
Sometimes authorities are unable to identify rapidly the origin of a tainted product.In such cases, recalls or warnings often apply to all suppliers, even to those thathad not contributed to the contamination. Traceability enables more targetedrecalls by identifying more specically the product's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360700
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004904259
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012311918
Existence of a monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proved for a multistage game of first-price auctions with interbidder resale, with any finite number of ex ante different bidders. Endogenous gains at resale complicate the winner's curse and upset previous fixed-point methods...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390727
A long-standing unsolved problem, often arising from auctions with multidimensional bids, is how to design seller-optimal auctions when bidders' private characteristics ("types") differ in many dimensions. This paper solves the problem, assuming bidder-types stochastically independent across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236094
Existence of a monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proved for a multistage game of first-price auctions with interbidder resale, with any finite number of ex ante different bidders. Endogenous gains at resale complicate the winner’s curse and upset previous fixed-point...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779935
A long-standing unsolved problem, often arising from auctions with multidimensional bids, is how to design seller-optimal auctions when bidders' private characteristics ("types") differ in many dimensions. This paper solves the problem, assuming bidder-types stochastically independent across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766617