We develop a three-dimensional concept of supervisor-subordinate guanxi. This concept includes affective attachment, personal-life inclusion, and deference to supervisor. Based on this concept, we conducted three studies to develop and validate a three-dimensional supervisor-subordinate guanxi...

In this research, we compared and contrasted the effects of managers’ interpersonal level guanxi practice and group level guanxi practice on employees’ procedural justice perceptions. Results indicated that interpersonal guanxi practice was associated with increased employee fairness...

Purpose: The current article aims to develop and validate the strengths-based leadership (SBL) scale and to explore the association of SBL with task performance and the roles of work-related well-being (WWB) and work pressure in the relationship. Design/methodology/approach: The exploratory...

We experimentally explore public good production levels, and the endogenous formation of network structures to facilitate output sharing, among agents with heterogeneous production costs or valuations. Results corroborate the key theoretical insights of Kinateder & Merlino (2017) characterizing...

Using a laboratory experiment, we study the evolution of economic networks in the context of fragmented social identity. We create societies in which members can initiate and delete links to others, and then earn payoffs from a public goods game played within their network. We manipulate whether...

A principal (receiver) considers whether to accept a project whose total value depends on two aspects. In each period, an agent (sender) privately learns the value of one aspect with positive probability. We compare two common reporting protocols: frequent updating, which requires the sender to...

To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy passes or paid up front. With transfer promises, a vote costs nearly zero....

To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy is put to a vote or paid up front. With transfer promises, the leader buys...