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We study transactions in which sellers fears being underpaid because their outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize various observed contracts as solutions to such smart buyer problems. Key to these solutions is granting the seller upside participation. In contrast, the lemons...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905759
In many bilateral transactions, the seller fears being underpaid because its outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize a variety of observed contracts as solutions to such smart buyer problems. The key to these solutions is to grant the seller upside participation. In contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091703
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We compare activism and takeovers from a blockholder's perspective who can invest effort into improving firm value. Profits from the two intervention modes move in opposite directions when the marginal return to effort changes such that activism, although less efficient, can be more profitable....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856282
How should bidders finance tender offers when the objective of the takeover is to improve incentives? In such a setting, debt finance has benefits even when bidders have deep pockets: It amplifies incentive gains, imposes Pareto sharing on bidders and free-riding target shareholders, and makes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841473
This paper examines how the interaction of bidder's private information and target shareholders' free-riding behavior affects the equilibrium outcomes and bid design in tender offers. While pooling equilibria always exist, separating ones emerge only in two scenarios. First, the bidder can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012710797
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We derive the effects of credit risk transfer (CRT) markets on real sector productivity and on the volume of financial intermediation in a model where banks choose their optimal degree of CRT and monitoring. We find that CRT increases productivity in the up-market real sector but decreases it in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002844073
Certain markets are illicit because part of the supply is coerced, but little is known about the optimal regulation of such markets. We model a prostitution market with voluntary and coerced prostitutes and ask what regulation can restore the benchmark outcome that would arise under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235378