Showing 1 - 10 of 940
There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to managerial power or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269077
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004948323
There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to "managerial power" or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761844
We study the changes in CEO power and compensation that arise when firms go through financial distress. We use a matching estimator to identify suitable controls and estimate the causal effects of financial distress for a sample of U.S. public companies from 1992 to 2005. We document that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008472147
We study the dynamics of managerial influence and Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs) compensation over the course of financial distress during 1992 to 2012. Using a matching estimator to identify suitable controls, we find that under distress firms reduce managerial board appointments, intensify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048928
There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to "managerial power" or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324758
There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to "managerial power" or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779098
There is a debate on whether executive pay reflects rent extraction due to quot;managerial powerquot; or is the result of arms-length bargaining in a principal-agent framework. In this paper we offer a test of the managerial power hypothesis by empirically examining the CEO compensation of U.S....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720753
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805462
A great deal of attention has been paid in the literature to estimating the impacts of training programs. Much less attention has been devoted to how training agencies assign participants to training programs, and to how these allocation decisions vary with agency resources, the initial skill...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003814243