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This paper analyzes the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first and second-price auctions. The setting is the classic one of symmetric and independent private values, with ex ante homogeneous bidders. However, the seller is able to optimally set the reserve price. In both auctions the...
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This study assesses the impact of government shareholding on corporate performance using a sample of 643 non-financial companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. In view of the controversial empirical findings in the literature and the limitations of the least squares regressions, we adopt...
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We study an optimal information/mechanism design problem for selling an object to a number of privately informed bidders, in which the winning bidder competes with a third party under differentiated Cournot competition afterwards. We show how to decompose the problem into two sub-problems:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357093
In premium auctions, the highest losing bidder receives a reward from the seller. This paper studies the private value English premium auction (EPA) for different risk attitudes of bidders. We explicitly derive the symmetric equilibrium for bidders with CARA utilities and conduct an experimental...
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A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373824