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Reciprocal preferences have been introduced in the literature of social choice theory in order to deal with preference intensities. They allow individuals to show preference intensities in the unit interval among each pair of options. In this framework, majority based on difference in support...
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We present the axiom of weighted component fairness for the class of forest games, a generalization of component fairness introduced by Herings, Talman and van der Laan (2008) in order to characterize the average tree solution. Given a system of weights, component eciency and weighted component...
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We consider communication situations games being the combination of a TU-game and a communication graph. We study the average tree (AT) solutions introduced by Herings \sl et al. [9] and [10]. The AT solutions are defined with respect to a set, say T, of rooted spanning trees of the...
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We consider an alternative expression of the Shapley value that reveals a system of compensations: each player receives an equal share of the worth of each coalition he belongs to, and has to compensate an equal share of the worth of any coalition he does not belong to. We give an interpretation...
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For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is less than or equal to n(n-1)/2, where n is the cardinality of the player set. This number...
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In this article we study cooperative multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected forest on the player set. Players in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the forest. We introduce a new (single-valued) solution concept which is a...
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This article shows that, for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty coalition structure core, the number of steps required to switch from a payoff configuration out of the coalition structure core to a payoff configuration in the coalition structure core is less than or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015226240