This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second-price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on search engines. We construct a model that embodies few prior assumptions about parameters, and we present results that indicate...

This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on its search engine. We present results that indicate that this auction has a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We also show that...

This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second price auc- tion that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on its search engine. We present results that indicate that this auction has a multi- plicity of Nash equilibria. We also show that...

This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second price auc- tion that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on its search engine. We present results that indicate that this auction has a multi- plicity of Nash equilibria. We also show that...

The paper introduces a notion of complementarity (substitutability) of two signals which requires that in all decision problems each signal becomes more (less) valuable when the other signal becomes available. We provide a general characterization which relates complementarity and...

This paper considers bidder behaviour in the United Kingdom s UMTS spectrum auction. Evidence is reviewed which shows that some bidders in this auction did not bid straightforwardly in accordance with fixed valuations of the licenses. We go on to consider more speculative hypotheses about...

We consider the aggregation of individual agents' von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries into a social planner's von Neumann-Morgenstern preference. We start from Harsanyi's [18] axiomatization of utilitarianism, and ask under which conditions a social preference order that satisfies...

We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity", and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices are easy. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if strategic choices can be based on first-order...