For games of simultaneous action selection and network formation, game-theoretic behavior and experimental observations are not in line: While theory typically predicts inefficient outcomes for (anti-)coordination games, experiments show that subjects tend to play efficient (non Nash) strategy...

A key obstacle to coordination and cooperation in many networked environments is that behavior in each bilateral relationship is not observable to individuals outside that relationship: that is, information is local. This paper investigates when players can use communication to replicate any...

This paper explores the reluctance of men (women) to acknowledge or recognise the work, comments, and claims of new ideas by other men (women) via widespread and intense demonstrations of indifference. Instances like desk rejections by journals by not allowing papers to reach a review stage,...

In this paper we study the configuration dynamics and the societal equilibrium selection of repeated lattice games. Each player plays games only with his immediate neighbors hence indirectly interacts with everyone else. A player may or may not have perfect control over his action. Different...

Theoretical and experimental studies of noncooperative games increasingly recognize Nash equilibrium as a limiting outcome of players repeated interaction. This note, while sharing that view, illustrates and advocates combined use of convex optimization and differential equations, the purpose...

Cooperative equilibria can be supported in a repeated game when players use trigger strategies. This paper tests how well trigger strategies explain behavior in two-person experimental games. Reducing payoffs for choices larger than the Cournot level induces smaller average outputs, consistent...

We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of Nested-Split Graphs. Next, we refine our results and...

We consider network games in which players simultaneously form partnerships and choose actions. Players are heterogeneous with respect to their action preferences. We characterize pairwise Nash equilibria for a large class of games, including coordination and anti-coordination games, varying the...

The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the...

We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game...