Suppose that (X,A) is a measurable space and Y is a metrizable, Souslin space. Let Au denote the universal completion of A. Given f : X x Y !R and x 2 X, let f (x,xc) be the lower semicontinuous hull of f (x,xc). If f is (Au B(Y),B(R))-measurable, then f is (Au B(Y),B(R))-measurable.

We obtain conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game with infinitely many types and/or strategies that ensure the existence of a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The main existence results are illustrated in the context of all-pay auctions.

The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann's [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact...

We consider a shared ownership arrangement among consumers/owners as a means to organize production with an underlying decreasing average cost function typical of natural monopolies. The resulting output allocation yields a lower deadweight loss than the monopoly allocation, and is, in some...

This paper presents a novel axiomatic approach to measuring and comparing hierarchical structures. Hierarchies are fundamental across a range of disciplines – from ecology to organizational science – yet existing measures of hierarchical degree often lack systematic criteria for comparison....

The theory of incomplete contracting is rival to that of complete contracting as a frame of reference to understand contractual relationships. Both approaches rest upon diametrically opposed postulates and lead to very different policy conclusions. From a theoretical viewpoint, scrutiny of the...

We propose a dynamic version of the standard two-party electoral competition model adapted to nonlinear income taxation. The theory has a number of desirable features. First, equilibria always exist, even though the set of admissible tax policies is multidimensional. Second, the Nash set can be...

We show that supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess a pure strategy perfect equilibrium and a strategically stable set of pure strategies. We illustrate that, in continuous supermodular games, perfect equilibria may contain weakly dominated actions. Moreover, in...