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We consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002569949
We model a simple dynamic process in which boundedly rational agents learn through their interactions with others. Of interest is to study the process of contagion where by one action 'spreads throughout the population' and becomes conventional. We vary the network of player interaction between...
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We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We details the conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The emergence of conformity depends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003491164
We consider a simple model that combines elements of search and social learning. Acting in sequence, and observing the action adopted by a previous agent, agents must search for an action. We explore why agent heterogeneity may increase expected payoffs and demonstrate that social learning may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003491166
A simple expression is derived for the optimal strategy in the minimum effort game. This maps from player beliefs to an optimal effort level. From this expression the set of Nash equilibria in the game is fully characterized. All Nash equilibria are symmetric and involve at most two actions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011891195
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603099
We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their attributes, and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (e )Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In fact, every mixed strategy equilibrium can be used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009485025