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We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278055
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Nach intensiven Debatten über die Mängel der gegenwärtigen Fusionskontrolle hat die Europäische Kommission den Entwurf einer Reform vorgelegt. Darin wird insbesondere auch über die Einführung einer so genannten Effizienzverteidigung nachgedacht. Die Autoren analysieren, wann eine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009418284
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014013887
This paper sheds light on two mechanisms that make some citizens worse off from apolitical leader’s having access to more information. It also addresses the question whoare the losers and who are the winners. Moreover, it is discussed how the results of theanalysis can be helpful in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005854869
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This paper studies an extension of Rogoff (1985) where the central banker can choose how much effort to exert and thereby learn about a supply shock. With this assumption, it is not necessarily optimal for society to delegate to a .conservative. banker. This may explain why such delegation often...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278030
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A model of a two-candidate election is developed in which the candidates are mainly office-motivated but also to some arbitrarily small extent policy-motivated, and their chosen platforms are to some arbitrarily small extent noisy. The platforms’ being noisy means that if a candidate has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278083
We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278111