Network operators of competing infrastructures in European electronic communications markets face asymmetric regulation: incumbent telecommunications firms are required to open their networks for retail broadband competition, while cable companies have no such obligation. Furthermore, for...

Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bottlenecks which give rise to new questions of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types of asymmetry arising from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation for...

Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bottlenecks which give rise to new questions of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types of asymmetry arising from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation for...

Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bottlenecks which give rise to new questions of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types of asymmetry arising from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation for...

Network operators of competing infrastructures in European electronic communications markets face asymmetric regulation: incumbent telecommunications firms are required to open their networks for retail broadband competition, while cable companies have no such obligation. Furthermore, for...

A cikk a mobiltávközlés és az arra jellemző kétirányú hozzáférés (hívásvégződtetés) aszimmetrikus piacát elemzi piacszerkezeti modellek segítségével. Megvizsgálja, hogy aszimmetrikus helyzetben a szabályozás által előírt költségalapú végződtetési díj jóléti...

A cikk a mobiltávközlés és az arra jellemző kétirányú hozzáférés (hívásvégződtetés) aszimmetrikus piacát elemzi piacszerkezeti modellek segítségével. Megvizsgálja, hogy aszimmetrikus helyzetben a szabályozás által előírt költségalapú végződtetési díj jóléti...

This paper analyzes when it may be desirable for the government to stimulate open source software as a response to market failures in software markets. Our most important finding is that directly stimulating open source software, e.g. by acting as a lead customer, can improve dynamic efficiency...