In light of the fact that scientific collaboration is increasingly wide-spread, we analyze whether the positive relation between supervisor research productivity on the one hand and young researcher productivity on the other does in fact persist in research groups where several PhD and...

In our paper, we explore the diversity-performance link in knowledge production and argue it to be the result of two countervailing effects (resource vs. process perspective). Theoretically, we show that the relative strength of the two effects crucially depends on moderating factors that relate...

This chapter analyzes how one particular governance mechanism affects the performance of research teams. We look at an external requirement for interdisciplinarity and internationality of Research Training Groups (RTGs) and study how their performance is affected. We expect to observe two...

In this paper, we analyze whether structured PhD programs operate at optimal size and whether there are differences between different disciplinary fields. Theoretically, we postulate that the relation between the size of a PhD program and program performance is hump shaped. For our empirical...

We argue that the link between women directors in co‐determined supervisory boards and firm innovation depends on two contextual factors: (1) Women directors' power, as measured by their share among shareholder representatives, and (2) on whether women are represented in both representative...

In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoffis exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenouslydetermined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier resultsfor two-person generosity games show that participants seem to caremore for eciency than for equity....

Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships.While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions,it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce complianceby crowding-out intrinsic motivation. We add...

In generosity games, one agreement payo is exogenously given,whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the"pie" size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiencyor equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity...