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We present a theory for why it might be rational for a platform to limit the number of applications available on it. Our model is based on the observation that even if users prefer application variety, applications often also exhibit direct network effects. When there are direct network effects,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906010
We present a theory for why it might be rational for a platform to limit the number of applications available on it. Our model is based on the observation that even if users prefer application variety, applications often also exhibit direct network effects. When there are direct network effects,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906027
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008662083
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003783761
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011997678
We analyze how network effects affect competition in the nascent cryptocurrency market. We do so by examining the changes over time in exchange rate data among cryptocurrencies. Specifically, we look at two aspects: (1) competition among different currencies, and (2) competition among exchanges...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141805
Digital currencies have attracted strong interest in recent years and have the potential to become widely adopted for use in making payments. Public authorities and central banks around the world are closely monitoring developments in digital currencies and studying their implications for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953280
This paper reviews some recent developments in digital currency focussing on platform-sponsored currencies such as Facebook Credits. In a model of platform management, we find that it will not likely be profitable for such currencies to expand to become fully convertible competitors to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905278
We propose a way to compare the extent of preference misrepresentation between two strategies. We define a preference revelation mechanism to be monotone strategyproof if declaring a “more truthful” preference ordering dominates (with respect to the true preferences) declaring a “less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905438
In this paper we address the question of learning in a two-sided matching mechanism that utilizes the deferred acceptance algorithm. We consider a repeated matching game where at each period agents observe their match and have the opportunity to revise their strategy (i.e., the preference list...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124336