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Delegation and dynamic incentives
Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - 2014
Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010347364
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Delegation, worker compensation, and strategic competition
Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2014
schemes for the workers. We show that the value of delegation as well as the optimal design of the compensation scheme …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010233989
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Separation of ownership and control : delegation as a commitment device
Boukouras, Aristotelis - 2011
This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker, whose effort is necessary for running a project. The worker's effort determines the probability that the project will be completed on time, but the worker...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010348626
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Essays in organization theory and personnel economics
Brilon, Stefanie - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008696489
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Incentives, reputation and the allocation of authority
Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010 - First Version: January 2002; Revised, February 2010
We address the question how much authority a principal should delegate to a manager with conflicting interests and uncertain ability in a context in which the manager has both compensationbased and reputational incentives. The optimal level of authority balances the value of the manager's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822070
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Separation of ownership and control : delegation as a commitment device
Boukouras, Aristotelis - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011287665
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Team incentives and leadership
Drouvelis, Michalis; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sefton, Martin - 2015
We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance, and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism, where team output is shared equally among team members, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010515808
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When pay increases are not enough : the economic value of wage Delegation in the field
Jeworrek, Sabrina; Mertins, Vanessa - 2014
By conducting a natural field experiment, we test whether a managerial policy of allowing employees to self-determine their wages is as successful as recently suggested by laboratory evidence. We find that this policy indeed enhances performance. However, our data is clearly at odds with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354002
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On delegation under relational contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - 2006
In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874
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Empowerment and the dark side of delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project … selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221