information alleviates the contracting problem only partially and its optimal use depends on the signal's accuracy and timing … principle, the optimal contract under non-verifiability is derived by employing the theory of communication equilibrium. …

there are two distinct sources of inefficiencies: inefficient contracting by a given coalition of active principals and … illustrated by means of two games: a public goods game in which each player simultaneously offers a menu contract to a common …

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of …

We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full …

Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their …

types, we find that the optimal contract may be very simple, paying the supervisor a flat wage independent of his type and … his evaluation of the agent's effort. Such a contract induces the neutral type of supervisor to report the agent … performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of an optimal contract under informational asymmetries …