We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent's action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht, welche Anreize von asymmetrischer Besteuerung einerseits und von Haftungsbeschränkungen andererseits für die optimale Risikowahl eines Unternehmens ausgehen. Wir betrachten dabei eine risikobehaftete Investition, deren Risikograd wertrelevant verändert werden kann,...

We examine the combined effects of asymmetric taxation and limited liability on optimal risk taking of investors. Given an optimal risk level in the pre-tax case under full liability, loss-offset restrictions reduce, and limited liability enhances the incentives for taking risk. For every degree...

During the last years the lending business has come under considerable competitive pressure and bank managers often express concern regarding its profitability vis-a-vis other activities. This paper tries to empirically identify factors that are able to explain the financial performance of bank...

In diesem Beitrag werden sowohl persönliche Steuern des Agenten als auch die vom Prinzipal zu tragende Unternehmenssteuer in ein Agency-Modell des LEN-Typs integriert. Wir analysieren die Auswirkungen dieser Steuern auf die optimale Anreizgestaltung. Für das Grundmodell mit nur einer...

A premise of standard setters and of much empirical research is that improving the quality of accounting standards and their implementation increases information in capital markets. This paper challenges this premise and shows that there are situations in which “better”, i.e., more...

We examine the combined effects of asymmetric taxation and limited liability on optimal risk taking of investors. Given an optimal risk level in the pre-tax case under full liability, loss-offset restrictions reduce, and limited liability enhances the incentives for taking risk. For every degree...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht, welche Anreize von asymmetrischer Besteuerung einerseits und von Haftungsbeschränkungen andererseits für die optimale Risikowahl eines Unternehmens ausgehen. Wir betrachten dabei eine risikobehaftete Investition, deren Risikograd wertrelevant verändert werden kann,...

We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent's action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...