We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set...

We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred. Second, from any network...

A set of coalition structures <em>P</em> is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to <em>P</em> to a coalition structure outside <em>P</em> are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any...

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any...

We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The novelty is that we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device, where each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching...

We provide a tractable concept that can be used to study the influence of the degree of farsightedness on network stability. A set of networks GK is a level-K farsightedly stable set if three conditions are satisfied. First, external deviations should be deterred. Second, from any network...

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set...

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set, which is based on the notion of a myopic-farsighted improving path. A myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of...

We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption of coalitional sovereignty, meaning that a deviating coalition of players does not have the power to arrange the matches of agents outside the coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and...

We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set of Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2019) to answer this question. We find that in...