We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition by forming a cartel. We find that cartel firms have lower leverage during collusion periods. This is consistent with the idea that cartel firms strategically reduce leverage to make their cartels more...

We analyze the role of toeholds (non-controlling but significant equity stakes) as a source of information for a bidder. A toehold provides an opportunity to interact with the target and its management and in the process get a better sense of the possible synergies from a merger or takeover. A...

We study the performance of investments made at different points of an investment cycle. We use a large data set covering hotels in the U.S., with rich details on their location, characteristics and performance. We find that hotels built during hotel construction booms underperform their peers....

We study the performance of investments made at different points of an investment cycle. We use a large data set covering hotels in the U.S., with rich details on their location, characteristics and performance. We find that hotels built during hotel construction booms underperform their peers....

We analyze how the availability of internal funds affects a firm's investment in the presence of capital market imperfections. Using a model that endogenizes the cost of external funds and allows for negative levels of internal funds, we show that under otherwise standard assumptions, investment...

We show that firms may benefit from allowing some earnings management, because it can make noisy signals more informative. We model a firm that cannot observe a manager's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated a publicly observable signal. An optimal contract links...

Firms sometimes commit fraud by altering publicly reported information to be more favorable, and investors can monitor firms to obtain more accurate information. We study equilibrium fraud and monitoring decisions. Fraud is most likely to occur in relatively good times, and the link between...

Target firms are often faced with bidders that are not equally well informed. This reduces the competition between the bidders, since a less well informed bidder fears the winner's curse more. We analyze how a target should optimally be sold in the presence of asymmetric bidders. We show that a...

We study financial contracting when both an entrepreneur's investment and the resulting revenue are unobservable to an outside investor. The optimal contract must induce the entrepreneur both to choose a particular investment and to repay the investor; what complicates the problem is that once...

Stapled Finance is a loan commitment arranged by a seller in an Mamp;A setting. The key feature is that whoever wins the bidding contest has the option (not the obligation) to accept the loan commitment. Stapled finance has become common: in 2004, it was offered in 39% of US deals that involved...