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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674462
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2, pp. 445-482
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599519
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - In: Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) 2
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773115
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535532
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Bargaining over an endogenous agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010392414
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Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545656
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Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J. - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2011
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010611965
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Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda
Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2012
We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568440
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Collective hold-up
Iaryczower, Matiás; Oliveros, Santiago - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 3, pp. 1063-1100
of complementary patents. In this context, we study how the allocation of bargaining power between principal and agents … completion, efficiency requires concentrating bargaining power in the principal. Strengthening the bargaining position of the … or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents are better off when bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537034
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Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas - 2011
We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307744