We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a "rational"' ranking to non-rationalizable choice data. We define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function (or choice distribution) gives the empirical...

Consider a society with a finite number of sectors (social issues or commodities). In a partial equilibrium (PE) mechanism a sector authority (SA) aims to elicit agents' preference rankings for outcomes at hand, presuming separability of preferences, while such presumption is false in general...

This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them.In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...

In this paper, we establish an axiomatically founded generalized recursive smooth ambiguity model that allows for a separation among intertemporal substitution, risk aversion, and ambiguity aversion. We axiomatize this model using two approaches: the second-order act approach à la Klibanoff,...

A choice behavior is rational if it is made in accordance with the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This paper re-examines the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting in which players' choices need not be rational and in...