We propose a solution concept for a class of extensive form games with ambiguity. Specifically we consider multi-stage games. Players have CEU preferences. The associated ambiguous beliefs are revised by Generalized Bayesian Updating. We assume individuals take account of possible changes in...

In [7] Ghirardato, Macheroni and Marinacci (GMM) propose a method for distinguishing between perceived ambiguity and the decision-maker's reaction to it. They study a general class of preferences which they refer to as invariant biseparable. This class includes CEU and MEU. They axiomatize a...

This paper considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations. It extends the earlier literature by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity. Ambiguity is modelled by CEU preferences. We propose a new solution concept for players who may express ambiguity-preference. Then we study...

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under...