In this study, we examine the wealth effects of regulatory changes intended to improve corporate governance by protecting minority shareholders from expropriation by controlling shareholders. Using data from publicly traded Chinese firms, we find that these new regulations significantly...

We examine stock returns for a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms around announcements of block share transfers from government agencies to corporatized firms where the State is the ultimate controlling shareholder. We provide evidence that these transfers improve corporate governance and...

We examine changes in market values and accounting returns for a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms around announcements of block-share transfers among government agencies (quot;State Bureaucratsquot;), market-oriented State-owned enterprises (quot;MOSOEsquot;) and private investors...

We examine the wealth effects of three regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm's related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, we find that firms with weaker...

We identify and analyze a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms that issued loan guarantees to their related parties (usually the controlling block holders), thereby expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. Our results show that the issuance of related guarantees is less likely at...

We identify and analyze a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms that issued loan guarantees to their related parties (usually the controlling block holders), thereby expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. Our results show that the issuance of related guarantees is less likely at...

We explore usefulness of a measure based on 10-K disclosures of firm-specific climate risk exposure. We find that our measure is negatively associated with firm value and positively associated with implied cost of capital and beta. Climate risk disclosure tone is significantly associated with...

Companies planning a private placement typically gauge the interest of institutional buyers before the offering is publicly announced. Regulators are concerned with this practice, called wall-crossing, as it might invite insider trading, especially when the potential investors are hedge funds....

On the day that dividends are paid we find a significant positive mean abnormal return that is completely reversed over the following days. This dividend pay date effect has strengthened since the 1970s, and is consistent with the temporary price pressure hypothesis. The pay date effect is...