Prior research shows that religion promotes honesty. Honesty in turn motivates managers to view an expropriation from shareholders as self-serving, opportunistic, and unethical, thereby alleviating the agency conflict. Religious piety is thus expected to discourage agency-driven acquisitions...

We show that firms located geographically close to one another share a similar probability of having staggered boards (or classified boards), an effect probably due to investor clientele, local competition, and social interactions. We then exploit the variation across the zip codes in the...

We explore the effect of economic policy uncertainty on board gender diversity. Prior research shows that female directors play a beneficial role. The advantage of board gender diversity should be particularly helpful when firms have to navigate an uncertain environment. So, we hypothesize that...

We examine the interactions among ownership structure, liquidity, and corporate governance in an important emerging market. The results suggest that firms with more concentrated ownership experience significantly lower stock liquidity. Large shareholders are assumed to possess private...

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate the effect of board independence on dividend policy. We exploit as a quasi-natural experiment the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated exchange listing requirement, mandating firms to have a majority of independent directors. Our...

Motivated by agency theory, we explore how powerful CEOs view leverage. Due to the agency conflict, CEOs may adopt sub-optimal leverage levels that promote their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to gauge CEO...

CEOs are “lucky” when they receive stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing. Extending the work of Bebchuk, Grinstein, Peyer (2010), we explore the effect of overall corporate governance quality on CEO luck....

We explore the effect of co-opted directors on R&D investments. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office. Because a co-opted board represents a weakened governance mechanism that diminishes the probability of executive removal, managers are less likely to be...

CEOs are “lucky” when they are granted stock options on days when the stock price is lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing and severe agency problems (Bebchuck, Grinstein, and Peyer, 2010). Using idiosyncratic volatility as our measure of stock price...

Motivated by agency theory, we explore the potential impact of managerial entrenchment through staggered boards on dividend policy. The evidence suggests that firms with staggered boards are more likely to pay dividends and pay them more generously than do those with unitary boards. We also show...